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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the beneﬁts from a supply-side oriented ﬁscal tax policy
within the framework of a New Keynesian DSGE model. We show that counter-
cyclical tax rules, which are contingent on the observed welfare gap or alternatively
on the markup shock and levied on value added, reduce remarkably the inverse
impact of cost push shocks. We state that the tax rule establishes a path for the
evolution of marginal cost at the ﬁrm level that largely prevents built up of price
dispersion. We highlight that this tax policy is also eﬀective under a balanced-
budget regime. Hence, ﬁscal policy can disencumber monetary policy in the light
of cost push shocks.
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11 Introduction
A broad literature has focussed on welfare costs of exogenous shocks within the New
Keynesian framework with monopolistic distortions and nominal rigidities. In this respect,
it is well-known that demand shocks can be absorbed with no welfare costs by means of
monetary policy: an adjustment of the real interest rate pushes both, output and inﬂation,
to the desired levels of the society (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999; and Woodford, 2003).
This is not the case for supply shocks. Although a suﬃciently strong reaction of the
real interest rate to inﬂation is argued to be the best response to limit the adverse eﬀects
of cost-push shocks on the lifetime utility of a representative agent, a trade-oﬀ between
inﬂation and output emerges. While monetary policy steers the inﬂation rate closer to the
welfare-optimal level, it has to accept costs stemming from larger output variability. The
overall welfare costs of nominal rigidities are estimated up to three percent in consumption
equivalents (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2007; and Gertler and Lopez-Salido, 2007).
This highlights that monetary policy does not have a direct leverage on the supply side.
In this paper we emphasize on the role of a discretionary ﬁscal policy as an additional
instrument to stabilize cost-push shocks. In particular, we propose a simple tax rule that
builds on value-added taxes as an instrument. Our key ﬁnding is that ﬁscal authorities
can set up a path for value-added taxes that evolves countercyclical to cost push shocks,
and thus reduces any cost pressure at the ﬁrm level which improves welfare substantially.1
Those ﬁrms that are called upon to reset prices will then built on the promise of ﬁscal
authorities to smooth away cost push shocks and set prices in the neighborhood of those
price setters that have to leave prices unchanged. When ﬁscal policy is allowed to cushion
changes in tax rates by debt rather than government expenditures we state that debt
adopts a near random walk behavior in the presence of cost-push shocks. The levels of tax
rates and a suﬃciently strong feedback from tax rates to changes in the level of existing
debt are determined by long-run solvency considerations such that in steady state the
budget is balanced (Canzoneri, Cumbi and Diba, 2003; Linnemann and Schabert, 2003).
Although the general idea of simple ﬁscal rules has not been new, authors so far
have mainly focused on the idea of classical demand management, where government ex-
penditures are conditioned on the output gap such as J.B. Taylor (2000). In the New
Keynesian framework, ﬁscal policy has in the majority of cases been treated exogenously
1This seems in particular important as Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) report evidence from a
medium-scale model which comprises a number of real and nominal frictions that price stickiness emerges
at the most important distortion.
2so far. A notable exception is Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007), who explore the role of coun-
tercyclical ﬁscal policy in a full-ﬂedged DSGE model and analyze commitment solutions
for the case of a small open economy. They report evidence that price dispersion can
be completely wiped out by commitment solutions when ﬁscal authorities employ four
instruments, namely debt, government expenditures and taxes on labor and value added.
Our paper is complementary to the work of Leith and Wren-Lewis: (i) We show that
optimal ﬁscal rules under discretion and simple rules substantially improve welfare. (ii)
We report analytical evidence that such rules are also eﬀective under a balanced-budget
regime by means of MSV-solutions. (iii) We present robustness results from a sensitivity
analysis with respect to deep parameters. (iv) We simulate the behavior of the economy
with the occurrence of markup shocks.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the basic model is introduced. Section
3 presents analytical results on ﬁscal rules and price dispersion. In Section 4 we compare
active ﬁscal policy, where the ﬁscal policy maker pursues the countercyclical tax rule, to
a passive stance of ﬁscal policy by using a numerical approach. In Section 5 we conduct
robustness analysis. Section 6 summarizes the main ﬁndings and concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we present a New Keynesian DSGE model with ﬁrms, households, the
central bank and ﬁscal authorities. As standard, ﬁrms are partitioned into the ﬁnal good
sector and a continuum of intermediate good producers. Intermediate good producers
have some monopoly power over prices that are set in a staggered way following Calvo
(1983). Households obtain utility from consumption, public goods, leisure and invest in
state contingent securities. Monetary authorities are guided by a simple Taylor rule. The
government sector is ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes levied on value added or debt. Fiscal
policy is implemented by tax and spending rules.
The model is built on the framework of Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007), Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2007), and Linnemann and Schabert (2003) by sharing the same kind
of features such as debt ﬁnanced expenditures, state contingent tax rules and staggered
price setting. In particular we highlight the role of an active ﬁscal policy compared to a
neutral stance to ﬁght the welfare costs of price dispersion.
32.1 Final Good Producers
The ﬁnal good is bundled by a representative ﬁrm which operates under perfect compe-










where Yt is the ﬁnal good, Qt(i) are the quantities of the intermediate goods, indexed
by i ∈ (0,1) and εt > 1 is the time-varying elasticity of substitution in period t. Proﬁt











1−εt, where Pt(i) is the price of the
intermediate good i ∈ (0,1). In a similar way to Smets and Wouters (2003), we assume
that εt is a stochastic parameter. In this context, we deﬁne Φt = εt
εt−1 reﬂecting the
time-varying markup in the goods market and assume that Φt = Φ + ˆ Φt. Thereby, ˆ Φt
is i.i.d. normal distributed, and Φ = ε
ε−1 is the deterministic markup which holds in the
long-run ﬂexible price steady state.
2.2 Intermediate Good Producers
Firms indexed by i ∈ (0,1) operate in an environment of monopolistic competition. The
typical production technology is given by:
Yt(i) = Nt(i) , (3)







Pt(i)Yt(i) − WtNt(i), (4)
with Yt(i) = Qt(i) and τV AT
t denotes a value-added tax with τV AT
t ∈ (0,1). As cost
minimization implies that real marginal costs are equal to real wages with ϕt = wt the










The representative ﬁrm is assumed to set prices as in Calvo (1983), which implies that
the price level is determined in each period as a weighted average of a fraction of ﬁrms
4(1 − θp) which resets prices and a fraction of ﬁrms θp that leaves prices unchanged:
Pt =
h






where ˜ Pt is the optimal reset price in period t.
Each ﬁrm i that is called upon to reset prices solves the following intertemporal proﬁt
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V AT











where ϑt+k denotes the Lagrangian multiplier in period t + k, and ∆t,t+k denotes the
stochastic discount factor of shareholders, to whom proﬁts are redeemed. It is deﬁned as








˜ Pt(i)(1 − τ
V AT





We assume a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ (0,1). A typical household seeks






where β denotes a discount factor with β ∈ (0,1), and period utility is given by:












σ is a coeﬃcient of risk aversion, η is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
and χ ∈ (0,1) measures the relative weight of public consumption Gt. Ct(j) are the real














Each household decides on consumption expenditures Ct(j) and bond holdings Bt+1(j)
and receives labor income WtNt(j) , dividends from proﬁts Πt(j)/Pt and the gross return
on bonds purchased Bt(j).
5Maximizing the objective function subject to the intertemporal budget constraint with
respect to consumption and bond holdings delivers the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
(1 − χ)C
−σ
t = λt, (12)
N
η











where λt denotes the Lagrangian of the budget constraint (11). Combining the ﬁrst order





















(1 − χ). (16)
Note that we can drop the index j for consumption Ct due to the existence of contingent
claims markets, which equalize wealth across households at each point in time.
2.4 Fiscal Authorities
The government issues bonds and collects value-added taxes. It uses its receipts either to












+ Gt . (17)
Letting ¯ X denote the determinate steady state of a variable Xt, and bt = 1
¯ Y [(Bt/Pt−1) −
( ¯ B/ ¯ P)] and ¯ B = 0, the budget constraint can be rewritten as:
R
−1




















which is conditioned on the predetermined state variables Φt and bt. In principle a suf-
ﬁcient strong response to the change of the level of outstanding debt χ2 > 0 assures
uniqueness and determinacy. A parameter χ1 < 0 denotes a countercyclical ﬁscal tax
policy. Additionally, we consider a simple tax rule. Note that in the literature simple
rules are predominantly interpreted as rules where the instrument responds to observable
6macroeconomic variables, e.g to the inﬂation rate or for instance to the welfare gap (e.g.,
Schitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007). Therefore, we opted to consider also an alternative tax








The welfare gap is deﬁned as Xt ≡ Yt/Y
f
t , i.e. as the ratio between the actual output and
output which would occur under ﬂexible prices. The superscript f denotes ﬂexible prices.
We determine the respective parameter χ1 for both types of ﬁscal tax rules such that the
rules are optimal from the perspective of a discretionary ﬁscal policy. As Φt and bt are
predetermined state variables equation (19) describes the optimal feedback rule from a
discretionary perspective.
In Section 3, we derive analytical results for the optimal tax rule (19), and we use
both types of tax rules in sections 4 and 5, where we consider the welfare implications of
both rules and check the robustness by using a numerical approach.
2.5 Market Clearance
In clearing of factor and good markets the following conditions are satisﬁed:






2.6 Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
In this section we summarize the model by taking a log-linear approximation of the key
equations around a symmetric equilibrium steady state with zero inﬂation and zero debt.
In the following, a variable ˆ Xt denotes the log-linear deviation from the steady state value:
ˆ Xt = log(Xt) − log( ¯ X), where ¯ X represents the deterministic steady state.
Households The consumption Euler equation reads:
ˆ Ct = Et ˆ Ct+1 − σ
−1( ˆ Rt − Etˆ πt+1) , (21)
where ˆ πt is deﬁned as ˆ πt ≡ ˆ Pt− ˆ Pt−1, and we used that in the steady state ¯ R = β−1 which
follows directly from the consumption Euler equation. Under perfectly competitive labor
7markets the labor supply schedule is equal to:
ˆ wt = η ˆ Nt + σ ˆ Ct . (22)
Firms Log-linearization of (6) and (8) around a zero inﬂation steady state yields the
dynamics of inﬂation as a function of the wage ˆ wt, a stochastic markup ˆ Φt and tax rates
ˆ τV AT
t :
ˆ πt = βEt(ˆ πt+1) + κ[ˆ wt + ιˆ τ
V AT
t + ˆ Φt], (23)
with κ ≡ (1 − θp)(1 − βθp)/θp, and ι ≡ ¯ τV AT/(1 − ¯ τV AT).
Fiscal authorities Log-linearizing the budget constraint around a zero steady state
debt yields the following approximation up to ﬁrst order:
bt+1 + γG(ˆ τ
V AT
t + ˆ Yt) = β
−1bt + γG ˆ Gt , (24)
where for the case of a balanced budget (24) simpliﬁes to ˆ Gt = ˆ τV AT
t + ˆ Yt. The parameter
γG denotes the steady state government share which is equal to ¯ τV AT implied by a balanced
budget in steady state.
A loglinearized ﬁscal spending rule is given by:
ˆ Gt = −oY ˆ Yt , (25)
where oY > 0 denotes the sensitivity of government expenditures with respect to output
movements.2
The simple tax rule is the log-linearized complement to (19):
ˆ τ
V AT
t = χ1ˆ Φt + χ2bt. (26)
Correspondingly, the log-linearization of the alternative tax rule (20) based on the welfare
gap xt is given by:
ˆ τ
V AT
t = χ1xt + χ2bt. (27)
The welfare gap is deﬁned as xt ≡ ˆ Yt− ˆ Y
f
t . In the following we will refer to a passive ﬁscal
policy if χ1 = 0 such that ﬁscal policy abstains from following a countercyclical path for
2Note that the welfare criterion (see section 4) is derived for the linear case: oY = 0 and oY = 1.
8taxes.
Monetary Policy Monetary policy is assumed to follow the Taylor rule:
ˆ Rt = (1 − φρ) ˆ Rt−1 + φρ[φπˆ πt + φxxt] , (28)
where φπ and φx capture the reaction coeﬃcients with respect to the inﬂation rate and
the output gap xt; (1−φρ) with 0 ≤ φρ ≤ 1 denotes the degree of interest rate smoothing
on part of the central bank.
Market Clearing Market clearing requires that the following relation holds:
ˆ Yt = γC ˆ Ct + γG ˆ Gt , (29)
where γC denotes the consumption share, which is equal to (1 − ¯ τV AT). Using (25) and
(29) we can rewrite the consumption Euler equation as follows:
ˆ Yt = Etˆ Yt+1 −
γC
σ(1 + γGoY )
( ˆ Rt − Etˆ πt+1) . (30)
Flex-price equilibrium The ﬂex-price equilibrium is obtained by equating ˆ wt =
η ˆ Nt+σ ˆ Ct and ˆ ϕt = ˆ wt which combines the real marginal product of labor to the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure:
ˆ ϕ
f
t = Γϕˆ Y
f
t , with Γϕ ≡ [η + σγ
−1
C (1 + γGoY)] , (31)
where we additionally used the ﬁscal spending rule (25) and market clearance condition
(29). From the optimal price-setting behavior of ﬁrms operating in the intermediate good





t (1 − τ
V AT
t ) , (32)
where we assumed that ﬁscal policy sets χ1 = 0 if prices are ﬂexible as no price dispersion




t. Accordingly the log-
deviation of real marginal cost from its deterministic counterpart (ε − 1)/ε can then be
written in log-linearized terms as: ˆ ϕ
f
t = −(ˆ Φt + ιˆ τt
V AT,f). Using the output gap xt the
log-deviation of marginal cost can be written as:
ˆ ϕt = Γϕ(xt + ˆ Y
f




ϕ (ˆ Φt + ιˆ τ
V AT,f
t ) . (33)
9We can rewrite the Phillips curve in terms of xt as:
ˆ πt = βEtˆ πt+1 + κ[Γϕxt + ι(ˆ τ
V AT
t − ˆ τ
V AT,f
t )] , (34)




t − ρ = σEt(∆ˆ Y
f
t+1 − ∆ ˆ G
f
t+1) , (35)
where ρ ≡ −logβ. Inserting ∆ˆ Y
f
t+1 and ∆ ˆ G
f
t+1 the natural rate can be expressed in terms
of the exogenous shock ∆ˆ Φt+1 and the tax rule ∆ˆ τ
V AT,f
t under ﬂexible prices:
ˆ r
n
t = −σ(1 + oY )Γ
−1
ϕ Et[∆ˆ Φt+1 + ι∆ˆ τ
V AT,f
t ] . (36)
Using the deﬁnitions of the welfare gap xt it holds that:
xt = Etxt+1 − γC(σ(1 + γGoY ))
−1[ ˆ Rt − Etˆ πt+1 − ˆ r
n




ϕ (1 + oY)ˆ τ
V AT,f
t = β
−1bt − γG(oY + 1)xt + γGΓ
−1
ϕ (1 + oY )ˆ Φt − γGˆ τ
V AT
t .(38)
Discussion Notwithstanding that most of the features in the model are standard in
particular the value-added tax augmented Phillips curve is worth stressing. First, notice
that the inﬂation rate is a weighted average of the expected path of wage costs, the
markup shock and the evolution of the value-added taxes. As we will show below this
enables the government to design a path for value-added taxes which almost completely
oﬀsets any movement in cost pressure such that price dispersion across ﬁrms can be
reduced. Secondly, as we formulate state contingent tax and spending rules government
debt necessarily works as a buﬀer to accommodate movements in the spending rule and
movements of the tax rate. For the case of a balanced budget regime movements in the
tax rate call for adjustments in ﬁscal spending.
2.7 Graphical Illustration of the Model
Throughout Section 2, we have shown the optimization problems of households, interme-
diate good producers and ﬁnal good ﬁrms, and we have introduced the rules of monetary
and ﬁscal policies. To help the reader to capture how all agents interact with each other,
ﬁgure 1 illustrates the sequence of the actions for a certain period t and adumbrates the
intertemporal links.
10Figure 1: Structure and Sequence of the Model
3 Simple Rules and Price Dispersion
In this Section we analytically examine the role of simple tax rules on the equilibrium
allocation of inﬂation, output, consumption, interest rates and government expenditures.
To keep the calculations analytically tractable, we assume that the budget is balanced such
that (26) reduces to ˆ τV AT
t = χ1ˆ Φt and government expenditures are adjusted passively
so that the budget equation (24) holds. Additionally, we reduce the system by inserting
the natural rate of interest ˆ rn
t and the tax rule (26) into the Phillips curve (34) and the
Euler equation (37). Then the model can be written as the following set of expectational
diﬀerence equations:
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1( ˆ Rt − Etˆ πt+1) + (γGγ
−1
C χ1 + (σ + η)
−1)ˆ Φt, (39)
ˆ πt = βEtˆ πt+1 + κ[(σ + η)xt + (ι − σ)γGγ
−1
C χ1ˆ Φt], (40)
ˆ Rt = φπˆ πt, (41)
where the coeﬃcient χ1 serves as a parameter which can be freely chosen by ﬁscal author-
ities. The following propositions summarize the main results.3
3For the MSV-solutions, see appendix B.
11Proposition 3.1 Suppose that a social planer is only concerned about price disper-
sion and, hence, inﬂation variability. Then choosing a coeﬃcient χ1 = −γCγ
−1
G (ι + η)−1
completely eliminates any price dispersion across ﬁrms at any date t.
Proof Since the simpliﬁed model with bt+1 = bt = 0 exhibits no endogenous state
variables the fundamental solution takes the form: ˆ πt = δπˆ Φt. Applying the methods of
undetermined coeﬃcients leads to the following solution: δπ = [1+κ(σ+η)σ−1φπ]−1κ[1+
γGγ
−1
C χ1(ι + η)]. Inﬂation is completely stabilized if δπ = 0 which holds for χ1 =
−γCγ
−1
G (ι + η)−1.
Thus according to Proposition 3.1 ﬁscal authorities can completely stabilize the inﬂation
rate by choosing χ1 appropriately. For the applied calibration, χ1 would take a numerical
value of χ1 = −3.20 (γG = 0.2; η = 1; ι = 0.25). Interestingly the coeﬃcient χ1 only
depends on two deep parameters, namely ¯ τV AT and η. In line with intuition an increas-
ing steady state government share γG increases the leverage of ﬁscal authorities on real
marginal costs and on prices such that the same equilibrium allocations can be achieved
by smaller movements of the instrument τV AT
t . The same holds true for ι which is deﬁned
as ι ≡
¯ τV AT
1−¯ τV AT and is increasing in ¯ τV AT. Additionally, the responsiveness of the coeﬃcient
χ1 decreases in the inverse Frisch elasticity η of labor supply. Thus, if economic cycles
evolve less pronounced due to a more inelastic labor supply, smaller tax incentives are
suﬃcient to yield the same eﬀects on the evolution of marginal cost, and hence prices.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose that we compare two economies which are identical except
that in one economy ﬁscal policy implements the simple rule ˆ τV AT
t = χ1ˆ Φt whereas in the
other economy ﬁscal policy remains passive with ¯ τV AT = τV AT
t and ¯ G = Gt ∀t. Then,
for any policy choice with χ1 < 0 the evolution of the inﬂation rate ˆ πt, the welfare gap xt
and nominal interest rates ˆ Rt evolve smoother than in an economy where χ1 = 0.
Proof Since in both economies the simpliﬁed model exhibits no endogenous state vari-
able the fundamental solution takes in both cases the form ˆ Xt = δX ˆ Φt, with ˆ Xt = [ˆ πt xt ˆ Rt]
and δX = [δπ δx δR]. Thus a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a smoother evolution of
the economy is |δA
X|i,1 < |δP
X|i,1 for i = 1,2,3, where the superscripts A denote active and
P passive. As shown in appendix B a necessary and suﬃcient condition for this inequality
12to hold is that χ1 < 0.
Thus according to Proposition 3.2 it holds that any policy choice with χ1 < 0 accommo-
dates a smoother evolution of the economy. Without any statement on welfare, we can
already conjecture that an active ﬁscal stance is welfare improving if government expen-
diture is pure waste as the welfare function for this case only builts on inﬂation ˆ πt and
the welfare gap xt. The nominal interest rate will be smoothed as it is just a linear trans-
formation of the inﬂation rate itself according to the Taylor rule. This in turn, implies a
smoother evolution of the real interest rate which fosters a more stable consumption path












which states that the product of the real interest rate and the intertemporal ratio of
consumption will always be equal to the inverse of the discount factor.
For the case of a balanced budget, changes in the tax rate have to be cushioned by ﬁscal
spending ˆ Gt. Therefore, ﬁscal spending is more volatile than under a passive ﬁscal stance.
Notwithstanding the output gap ˆ Yt, deﬁned as the weighted sum γC ˆ Ct + γG ˆ Gt, evolves
less volatile. This reﬂects that the additional volatility in government expenditure is
overcompensated by the stable evolution of consumption itself. As the expected variability
of the weighted average of private and public consumption good decreases, this is welfare
enhancing given the concavity of preferences.
4 Welfare
Next we characterize the model if we allow for debt ﬁnanced expenditures by means of
numerical analysis. As shown in the appendix C the welfare criterion is derived by a
second-order approximation of the average utility of a household around the determin-
istic long-run steady state. The welfare function can be written as follows (see Erceg,












t + (1 + η)ˆ Y
2
t + ι( ˆ Gt − ˆ Yt)
2. (44)
13In the following we discuss the implementation of the proposed tax rules. We start with
the optimal rule under discretion given by (26), which is based directly on the shock ˆ Φt,
and check afterwards whether similar results will hold for the simple tax rule (27).
4.1 Optimal Tax Rule under Discretion
Since we do not have a distinctive imagination for an appropriate numerical parameter
except that χ1 < 0, we opt to choose the parameter such that the welfare function (43)
is minimized.4
Figure 2 portrays the dynamic responses of selected variables to a markup shock.
For the baseline case ﬁscal policy remains passive with χ1 = 0 whereas for the active
stance with χ1 < 0 ﬁscal policy aspires to improve welfare by controlling the evolution of
marginal cost. The following remark summarizes the main ﬁndings:
Remark: The implementation of rule (26) largely disconnects the evolution of the inﬂa-
tion rate from exogenous markup shocks. If free to choose ﬁscal authorities prefer long
debt cycles to cushion the exogenous shock.
The impulse responses portray that a sharp cut in taxes ˆ τV AT
t levied on the value-added
prevents built up in cost pressure. The tax cut occurs in particular in the ﬁrst quarter,
when the geometrically decaying markup shock hits strongest. As a fraction of ﬁrms
θP is called upon to reset prices they foresee that any price pressure is undone by ﬁscal
authorities by the targeted tax path that keeps the sum of wage path, markup shock and
tax path ﬂat. Due to the moderate evolution of the inﬂation rate monetary authorities
are prevented from sharply raising nominal interest rates. This in turn detains Ricardian
households to reallocate planned consumption expenditures by large into the future. As
consumption accounts for 80% of output we observe a more moderate drop in production.
If ﬁscal authorities are free to choose, they absorb the tax cut by a near-random walk
behavior in debt. Note as markup shocks are symmetrically distributed a near-random
walk behavior in debt implies that the persistent swings cancel out each other. On the
4We also optimized over the parameter χ2 which governs the feedback from changes in debt and
taxes. The algorithm preferred small values which are close to those proposed by Linnemann and Schabert
(2003). As the algorithm often fall prey to indeterminacy for too small values of χ2, we chose a calibration
of χ2 = 0.06.
14contrary, contemporaneous government-expenditure changes are welfare reducing as they
increase the expected variability in consumption of public goods. The point estimate

































































Notes: Responses of selected variables to a markup shock. Solid lines indicate a state indepen-
dent passive ﬁscal policy with χ1 = 0 . The dotted line shows the impulses of the model when
ﬁscal policy is active with χ1 < 0 and χ2 > 0 . For the applied baseline calibration see appendix
A. All depicted variables are denoted in log-deviations.
for the parameter χ1 and the associated standard errors are reported in Table 1. The
point estimate for χ1 is equal to -1.60 with a standard error of 0.11. For the baseline
scenario this implies that the implementation of the simple policy rule reduces the value







Active is chi-square distributed5 with one degree of freedom the loss reduction
is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Under the header “range” we report evidence that
the proposed policy rule is robust with respect to deviations from the optimal reaction
coeﬃcient χ1. To illustrate this we deviate from the optimal coeﬃcient such that the
5For the choice of the chi-square distribution see e.g. Meier, M¨ uller, 2005, and Wooldridge, 2002.
15implementation of the policy rule still signiﬁcantly reduces the business cycle at the one
percent signiﬁcance level. Therefore, as a robustness exercise we report how far we can







Active,upper,lower is still signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
Generally the results indicate no large asymmetries when ﬁscal authorities tend to choose
too high or too low coeﬃcients χ1, which indicates that the loss ratio largely behaves
linearly when deviating from the baseline by altering χ1. For the case of large asymmetries
we would have expected the reported values for χlower
1 and χ
upper
1 to have a substantially
diﬀerent distance to −1.60. The range from -3.15 to -0.06 impressively demonstrates
that for a large set of parameters χ1 the policy rule stabilizes the economy signiﬁcantly.
Therefore we conclude that the proposed rule is robust with respect to variations in χ1.
Table 1: The Estimated Parameter
Parameter Symbol Value St.Dev. Range
Reaction Coeﬃcient χ1 -1.60 0.11 [-3.15, -0.06]
4.2 Alternative Simple Tax Rule
Analogously to the procedure in the previous subsection, we simulated the impulse re-
sponse functions for the simple tax rule based on xt. Figure 3 exhibits that compared
to the previous section, the impulse response functions for the selected variables take a
very similar course. Hence, we can state that the implementation of the simple tax rule
is highly suitable for stabilizing the economy after the materialization of markup shocks.
For the baseline calibration the loss reduction is 48 percent. This is somewhat worse
than for the discretionary optimum which reduced the loss by 69 percent. It might be
explained by the following trade oﬀ. In terms of the output gap inﬂation is driven by
Γϕˆ Yt + ιˆ τV AT + ˆ Φt, such that ﬁscal authorities target a tax path which sets the linear
combination of ˆ Yt, ˆ τV AT and ˆ Φt equal to null. If ﬁscal authorities attach a high weight
towards inﬂation stability there is obviously no strong motive for output gap smoothing,
as a decline in the output gap also stabilizes the inﬂation rate. This in particular prevails
for the case of a simple rule where the tax path is not ﬁne tuned towards the discretionary
optimum.
The corresponding point estimates for χ1 are given in Table 3: We obtain χ1 = −7.34
with a standard error of 0.38, which implies that the implementation of the simple policy

































































Notes: Responses of selected variables to a markup shock. Solid lines indicate a state indepen-
dent passive ﬁscal policy with χ1 = 0 . The dotted line shows the impulses of the model when
ﬁscal policy is active with χ1 < 0 and χ2 > 0 . For the applied baseline calibration see appendix
A. All depicted variables are denoted in log-deviations.
rule reduces the value of the loss function by 48 percent. The loss reduction is signiﬁcant
at the one percent level. The results are still robust over a large range for χ1 from -11.94
to -0.56.
Table 2: The Estimated Parameter
Parameter Symbol Value St.Dev. Range
Reaction Coeﬃcient χ1 -7,34 0.29 [-11.94, -0.56]
5 Relevance of the Tax-Rule
Markup shocks are costly in terms of welfare as monetary authorities lack an instrument
on the supply side of the economy to cushion the adverse eﬀects of cost pressure. Following
17the Tinbergen (1959) logic we have shown that a state contingent tax can improve welfare
remarkably.
In the following we discuss the implications of these issues by computing welfare gains
using diﬀerent parameter constellations. This exercise has two main purposes. On the
one hand we want to analyze whether the proposed rule is robust to perturbations of the
baseline parametrization. On the other hand we present further insights why the rule
works from a micro-founded perspective.
5.1 Robustness of the Optimal Tax Rule
Precisely speaking we compute the expected value of the loss E0{
P∞
t=0 βtLt} for the active
and the passive ﬁscal policy stance and then take the ratio of the two. If the ratio takes
the value one, then the loss would be equal under the two regimes. If the value of the ratio
is below (above) one, then the loss under an active ﬁscal policy is smaller (larger) than
the loss under the passive ﬁscal stance. By means of computing these ratios we succeed to
uncover those parameter constellations which improve or worsen the relative performance
of the proposed policy rule compared to the fallback position of a passive ﬁscal policy.
The solid line indicates how the computed ratio changes when the parameter displayed
at the top of the ﬁgure is altered, while the rest remains ﬁxed at the baseline calibration.
For each altered coeﬃcient, e.g. for η, the coeﬃcients in the ﬁscal policy rule χ1 and
χ2 are reoptimized such that the welfare function (43) is minimized. The inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply η was varied from one to four. The robustness analysis
indicates that with an increase of η the relative advantage of the policy rule increases from
a loss reduction of 69% to a reduction of around 75%. This reﬂects that the welfare gains
attached to rule (26) are larger if households dislike variations in labor. This reﬂects in
such an environment that smaller tax adjustments are suﬃcient to stabilize the economy.
Accordingly, the moderate tax cuts impose less distortions as ﬁscal authorities have to
increase taxes subsequently less pronounced for intertemporal solvency.
With respect to the Taylor rule coeﬃcient φπ the relative beneﬁt from the ﬁscal policy
rule increases if monetary policy gets somewhat more aggressive on inﬂation. This reﬂects
to a certain extend that a larger Taylor-rule coeﬃcient φπ implies that the real interest rate
volatility and thus the variations in the consumption aggregate over time increase. One
outstanding eﬀect of the ﬁscal policy rule (26) is that it disencumbers monetary policy
such that there is no need, even if monetary policy takes an aggressive stand towards
inﬂation to move the real interest rate a lot.


































































































































Notes: Evolution of the expected loss ratio deﬁned as the ratio of the expected








. Appendix A summarizes the ranges of deep pa-
rameters typically found in the literature.
The robustness analysis indicates that the relative advantage of the proposed policy
rule decreases if monetary policy reacts stronger on the welfare gap. Nevertheless, the
the loss reduction is still round about twenty percent, even for a coeﬃcient of φx = 1,
which is higher than the values typically found in literature (e.g., Smets and Wouters,
2003). This might be explained by the fact that the proposed tax rule is successful in
reducing inﬂation, but not so much in reducing output gap variability. This implies that
a monetary authority that takes the output gap into account reintroduces real interest
rate variability.
The performance of the rule worsens if interest rates are set in a highly inertial fashion.
Nevertheless the ratio only deteriorates by 13% when φρ increases from 0 to 0.75.
The eﬀectiveness of the rule decreases with the degree of correlation in the markup
shock ζ. The higher the degree of correlation the larger will be the price dispersion inﬂicted
upon the economy. Those ﬁrms that are called upon to reset prices will anticipate further
shocks in the same direction which triggers a larger adjustment of prices. Therefore,
the rule is welfare enhancing in an environment of correlated shocks as it promises to
19ﬁrms a stable evolution of prices and thus a limited degree of price dispersion for the
economy. If, however, the degree of correlation in the markup shock becomes too large,
ﬁscal authorities have to change the tax rate substantially which calls for subsequent tax
increases as solvency considerations have to be fulﬁlled.
With respect to the value of the Calvo parameter θP there exists a considerable dis-
agreement in the literature. Del Negro et. al. (2005) for instance estimate an average
price duration of three quarters for the euro-area using full information Bayesian tech-
niques; Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate a price duration of 10 quarters. Gali, Gertler,
and Lopez-Salido (2001) report a value round about four quarters using single equation
GMM approach. Empirical work on price setting in the euro area using micro evidence
report relatively low price durations with a median round about 3.5 quarters (see Alvarez
et. al., 2006, for a summary of recent micro evidence). Comparable studies for the U.S.
like Altig et. al. (2005) report much lower average price durations of just 1.6 quarters,
which they claim to be more consistent with recent evidence drawn from US micro-data.
Based on this review of the literature it seems fair to conduct the robustness analysis in a
range between 1.8 to 10 quarters, which corresponds to θP ranging between 0.45 to 0.90.
The ﬁgure illustrates that the performance of the rule is almost constant when the degree
of nominal stickiness increases from 0.45 to 0.75. The implementation of the policy rule
prevents that a wedge can be driven between the production schedules and thus enhances
welfare as the variability of inﬂation decreases. However, for a very high degree of price
rigidity (θP > 0.75) the ratio increases, as the ﬁscal rule loses its eﬀectiveness.
5.2 Robustness of the Simple Rule
Figure 5 portrays that the shape of the ratios are qualitatively almost identical under the
modiﬁed rule (27) compared to ﬁgure 4. But the ﬁgure shows that the loss ratios are
shifted upward for the baseline calibration around 20%. Note that there is one notable
diﬀerence standing out: Variations in η almost have no inﬂuence on the reported ratios.
This result can be traced back to the almost identical evolution for the output gap xt
under the simple rule and the passive policy stance. Put diﬀerently, as the simple tax rule
is not so eﬀective in stabilizing the output gap, the attached welfare gain does not increase
in agents’ dislike business cycle ﬂuctuations and thus variations in the labor supply more
strongly.





































































































































Notes: Evolution of the expected loss ratio deﬁned as the ratio of the expected








. Appendix A summarizes the ranges of deep pa-
rameters typically found in the literature.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we addressed the question whether ﬁscal policy can wipe out price dispersion
by implementing a countercyclical tax rule. Our motivation stems from the fact that
there is a large strand of literature which stresses the role of monetary policy to enhance
welfare in an environment of nominal rigidities (Woodford, 2003). However this strand of
literature has paid so far little attention to the question whether ﬁscal policy can improve
welfare with respect to nominal frictions. In the event of cost push shocks Woodford
(2003) shows that monetary policy faces a trade oﬀ between stabilizing the inﬂation
rate and stabilizing the output gap. A suﬃciently strong feedback from movements in
the inﬂation rate is argued to be the best response to limit the adverse eﬀects of cost-
push shocks on lifetime utility of a representative consumer to generate a unique and
determinate equilibrium. Notwithstanding these arguments, the costs of nominal rigidities
are estimated to be up to three percent in consumption equivalents (Canzoneri, Cumby
and Diba 2007).
21This highlights that monetary policy does not have a direct leverage on the supply
side of the economy. Therefore, we proposed that ﬁscal policy should use its value-added
tax, as an additional instrument in a state contingent way such that the evolution of
marginal cost is stabilized around its deterministic steady state. Our ﬁndings suggest
that countercyclical taxation can remarkably reduce the impact of cost push shocks on
welfare. The reduction in expected losses, when ﬁscal authorities switch from a passive
towards an active ﬁscal stance are quantiﬁed around 69% for the optimal tax rule and
48% for the simple tax rule, and depend on the particular parameter settings. Key to
the functioning of the tax-rule is that the fraction of ﬁrms that adjusts prices anticipates
the promise of ﬁscal authorities to target a value-added tax path that eliminates any cost
pressure at the ﬁrm level. Accordingly, those ﬁrms that are called upon to reset prices will
set them in the neighborhood of those ﬁrms that leave prices unchanged. This prevents
any ineﬃcient built-up in prices across ﬁrms at any date t.
The Keynesian tradition considers ﬁscal policy as operating over the aggregate de-
mand eﬀect. We showed that ﬁscal policy can use its distortionary instruments to unfold
stabilizing eﬀects on the economy upon an aggregate supply channel.
22Appendices
A Calibrated Parameters
In Section 5 of the main text we conduct some sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the
robustness of the proposed policy rule. While conducting this exercise we rely on ranges
of the deep parameters chosen in a way to best represent the uncertainty found in the
literature as reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Values and Ranges for the Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Baseline Range
A. Household
Discount factor β 0.99 /
Risk Aversion σ 1.00 /
Inverse of the Labor Supply Elasticity η 1.00 1.00 – 4.00
B. Firms
Price Elasticity of Demand for an Intermediate Good
Variety
ε 11.00 /
Price Stickiness θP 0.75 0.45 – 0.95
C. Monetary Policy
Taylor Rule: Smoothing φρ 0.50 0.00 – 0.75
Taylor Rule: Inﬂation φπ 1.50 1.10 – 2.00
Taylor Rule: Welfare Gap φx 0.25 0.00 – 1.00
D. Fiscal Authorities
Fiscal Rule (optimal): Markup shock χ1 -1.60 /
Fiscal Rule (simple): Welfare Gap χ1 -7.34 /
Fiscal Rule (both): Debt χ2 0.06 /
Steady State VAT Level ¯ τV AT 0.20 /
E. Exogenous Shock
Markup Shock: Persistence ζ 0.75 0.00 – 0.90
Remarks: The table displays the calibrated values. The respective upper and lower bounds
are taken from related studies in literature. The reviewed literature is Smets and Wouters,
2003; Leith and Maley, 2005, Rabanal, 2003, Coenen, McAdam and Straub, 2006, Del Negro,
Schorfheide, Smets and Wouters, 2004, Welz, 2005, Linnemann and Schabert, 2003.
23B Derivation of the MSV Solution
Balanced budget and active stance Substituting out the tax-rate ˆ τV AT
t and the
natural rate ˆ rn
t of interest the reduced form system can be written as:
xt = Etxt+1 − σ




χ1 + (σ + η)
−1
￿
ˆ Φt , (B.1)
ˆ πt = βEtˆ πt+1 + κ
￿










ˆ Rt = φπˆ πt. (B.3)
The rest of the system is recursive and can be solved afterwards. Let us posit a funda-
mental (minimum state variable) solution of the following generic form (McCallum, 1983):
ˆ πt = δπˆ Φt and xt = δxˆ Φt, where the coeﬃcients δπ and δx remain to be determined. With
Etxt+1 = Etδxˆ Φt+1 = 0 and Etˆ πt+1 = Etδπˆ Φt+1 = 0, this leads to the following conditions
for the undetermined coeﬃcients:










Inserting (B.5) into (B.4) yields
δπ = [1 + κ(σ + η)σ
−1φπ]
−1 · κ[1 + γGγ
−1
C χ1(1 + η)], (B.6)
and
δx =
σγC + (σ + κ(σ − ι)φπ)(σ + η)γGχ1
(σ + η)(σ + κφπ(σ + η))γC
. (B.7)
Balanced budget and passive policy Let us deﬁne the neutral benchmark system
as ˆ Gt = ˆ τV AT
t = 0. Then the model can be stated as:
xt = Etxt+1 − σ
−1(φπˆ πt − Etˆ πt+1) + (σ + η)
−1ˆ Φt , (B.8)
ˆ πt = βEtˆ πt+1 + κ(σ + η)xt , (B.9)
where the MSV solution reads:





δπ = κ[1 + σ
−1φπκ(σ + η)]
−1 . (B.11)
24Comparison of active versus passive ﬁscal policy In the following, we compare
the MSV solutions for an economy where ﬁscal policy implements policy rule (25) versus
an economy where ﬁscal policy remains passive with ˆ Gt = ˆ τV AT
t = 0. The superscript P







⇒ κ[1 + κσ
−1(σ + η)φπ]




C χ1(1 + η)]
⇒ 1 > 1 + γGγ
−1
C χ1(1 + η)
⇒ 0 > γGγ
−1












σγC + (σ + κ(σ − ι)φπ)(σ + η)γGχ1
(σ + η)(σ + κφπ(σ + η))γC
⇒ σγC > σγC + (σ + κ(σ − ι)φπ)(σ + η)γGχ1
⇒ 0 > (σ + κ(σ − ι)φπ)(σ + η)γGχ1
⇒ χ1 < 0, γG,κ,σ,ι,η > 0
C Utility-Based Welfare Function
The utility function is given by:




Note that the weight τ in the utility function is equal to the steady state share of govern-
ment spending τ = G/Y . Taking a second-order approximation around the consumption
part of the utility function yields:
log(Ct) = log(Yt − Gt) =
1
1 − τ




(1 − τ)2(ˆ Yt − ˆ Gt)
2 + tip + o(||a
3||) . (C.2)
25Where it holds that: ˆ xt = ˜ xt+(¯ xt−x). We denote the gap ˆ Yt = logYt−log ¯ Yt and the ﬁscal
gap ˆ Gt = logGt −log ¯ Gt. Note that ˆ Yt comprises the sum of the deviation of output from
the distorted (short term) steady state and the deviation of the distorted steady-state
output from the eﬃcient long-term steady state. Taking a second-order approximation
around the disutility of labor term yields:
N1+η
1 + η





t + tip + o(||a
3||). (C.3)























= YtDt . (C.5)
After log linearization, we obtain:
ˆ Nt = ˆ Yt + qt . (C.6)
Where qt = (ε/2)σ2
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Now, we aim at expressing σ2
t in terms of π2


































t + tip + o(||a||
3) . (C.9)
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